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RECENT CASES
a threat is probably premature at this time, there is a necessity for a more
solid framework if the possible emasculation of the state's sovereignty is to be
forever eliminated.

THEODORE S. KANTOR

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
-CONvICTION
OF A CHRONIC ALCOHOLIC FOR PUBLIC INTOXICATION NOT VIOLATIVE OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROSCRIPTION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT

On December 19, 1966, a police officer observed appellant Leroy Powell in
an intoxicated condition in the 2000 block of Hamilton Street in Austin, Texas,
and placed him under arrest for public intoxication. Appearing in the Corporation Court of Austin, appellant was found guilty of violating Article 477 of the
Texas Penal Code1 and fined $20.00. He appealed the conviction to the County
Court of Law No. 1 of Travis County, Texas, where a trial de novo was conducted. At the time of his trial, appellant was 66 years old. His life history
indicated that he had a severe drinking problem.2 The primary testimony at
1. Vernon's Penal Code, Art. 477, Vol. 1, 497 (1925).
2. "Appellant is 66 years old. He is married and has one child, a daughter. Although
appellant sometimes spends nights at home, he usually sleeps in public places, such as the
sidewalk, when he gets drunk. He does not support his wife or child.
Appellant worked as a laborer for the City of Austin until he injured his back in 1955.
Since then he has been unable to do heavy work. Beginning in 1956 or 1957 he has worked
in a tavern shining shoes. He currently earns about $12 per week, which he uses to buy wine.
Appellant began drinking alcoholic beverages in about 1925. His Austin Police
Department arrest record shows that he was first arrested there for public drunkenness in
1949, and that he has been arrested for drunkenness at least once every year since 1952. He
has been arrested for drunkenness on some 25 other occasions outside Travis County, primarily in Bastrop County.
The fine customarily imposed for drunkenness in Travis County is $20 and in Bastrop
County $25. Appellant is usually unable to pay the fine when he is arrested, and therefore
is required to work it off in jail. The record does not disclose how many months he has spent
in jail in lieu of paying fines.
Appellant's arrest record is only illustrative of his drinking problem. He testified that
he has been 'pretty lucky' in not being arrested when he is drunk. The record shows that
he drinks wine every day and becomes so drunk he passes out about once a week. The only
limitation on his consumption of alcohol is his megar income. Appellant took four or five
drinks the night before his trial, and another drink at 8 a.m. the morning before his trial.
The money for his morning drink was given to him, and he would have had more to drink
at the time if he had been given more money.
As a result of constant drinking and intoxication, appellant has been unable to find
employment anywhere but at the tavern. He applied for jobs both in the Austin Independent
School District and at the State Office Building but was turned down because of his drinking
problem.
Appellant's drinking, however, has not threatened harm to any member of the public.
Officer Mauldin testified that he was not engaged in loud or boisterous conduct, was not
fighting, and did not resist arrest. Apart from a single arrest for disorderly conduct in 1951,
all of appellant's arrests have been for public drunkenness.
Alcoholism has impaired appellant's perception and memory. He testified that he does
not always know where he is after he starts drinking. Indeed he was unable to recall anything
about his arrest for drunkenness which gave rise to the present conviction. Whole episodes
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trial, given in appellant's behalf,3 was that of Dr. David Wade, a nationally
recognized authority on alcoholism. 4 .The substance of Dr. Wade's testimony
was to the effect that chronic alcoholism 5 is a disease0 and that appellant was
a chronic alcoholic. 7 Accepting all the premises asserted by defense counsel, the
trial court entered as findings of fact: that chronic alcoholism is a disease which
destroys the afflicted person's will power to resist constant, excessive consumpof his life have been lost in an alcoholic fog." Brief for ACLU as Amiits Curiae at 6-8,
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).

3. The defense called two other witnesses. One, a police lieutenant in charge of the
Austin Identification Section, identified arrest records which indicated appellant had been
arrested 72 times for public drunkenness and once for disturbing the peace. The first arrest
was in 1949 and the last was the offense charged. The other defense witness, the arresting
officer, who testified to observing the appellant at a public place on Hamilton Street in
Austin, Texas. The policeman stated that appellant staggered when he walked; that he
smelled strongly of alcohol; and that his speech was slurred. The officer stated that in his
opinion appellant was "very intoxicated." Brief for Appellee at 2, Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514 (1968).

4. "After receiving his M.D. degree in 1939, Dr. Wade spent three years in a psychiatric
residency. He has since speciaized in psychiatry and has been especially interested in the
problem of alcoholism. He is a board-certified psychiatrist. Dr. Wade is Chief of Staff at
St. Jude's Oak Ridge Hospital, a private psychiatric hospital, about ten per cent of whose
patients have an alcohol problem. He has been superintendent of two Texas State mental
institutions. He currently serves on the staffs of four hospitals in the City of Austin and as a
consultant at the Kerrville Veterans Administration Hospital and at the Austin State Hospital.
He co-founded a branch at Texas Christian University of the Yale School for Alcoholic
Study, and frequently lectures and writes on the subject of alcoholism." Brief for ACLU
as Amicus Curiae at 8, Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
5. As defined in a 1947 Act of Congress, Rehabilitation of Alcoholics, 61 Stat. 744,
c. 472, the term chronic alcoholic means, "any person who chronically and habitually uses
alcoholic beverages to the extent that he has lost the power of self-control with respect to
the use of such beverages, or while under the influence of alcohol endangers the public morals,
health, safety, or welfare." The American Medical Association defines "alcoholic" as: "Those
excessive drinkers whose dependncee on alcohol has attained such a degree that it shows a
noticeable disturbance or interference with their bodily or mental health, their interpersonal
relations, and their satisfactory social and economic functioning."
6. In 1956, the American Medical Association for the first time designated alcoholism
as a major medical problem and urged that alcoholics be admitted to general hospitals for
care. American Medical Association: Report of Reference Committee on Medical Educations
an3 Hospitals, 162 J.A.M.A. 82 (1956). That alcoholism is a disease see also: Editorial,
Manual on Alcoholism, 202 JA.M.A. 539 (Nov. 6, 1967); American Medical Association,
Today's Health Guide 459 (1965); National Institute of Mental Health, United States
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Alcoholism, Public Health Service Pub. No.
730, at 9 (rev. 1963); National Institute of Mental Health, United States Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, Alcohol and Alcoholism, Public Health Service Pub. No.
1640, at 6-7 (1967). Additional authorities affirming the disease concept of alcoholism may
be found in Jellinek, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism (1960).
7. Dr. Wade testified that alcoholism is a disease which destroys an alcoholic's ability
to refrain from constant, excessive consumption of alcohol. He further testified that once
a person is afflicted with the disease of alcoholism, his appearances in public in a state of
intoxication would not only be involuntary on his part, but symptomatic of the disease of
chronic alcoholism. Concerning appellant's specific conduct, Dr. Wade testified that he does
not have the will power to resist constant consumption of alcohol and that his appearance
in public in a state of intoxication is involuntary. On cross-examination, Dr. Wade admitted
that when appellant was sober he knew the difference between right and wrong; that
appellant's act in taking the first drink in any given instance when he was sober was a
voluntary exercise of his will. Qualifying this answer, Dr. Wade said that these type individuals have a compulsion and this compulsion, while not completely overpowering, is a
very strong influence, and this compulsion, coupled with the firm belief in their mind that
they are going to be able to handle it from now on causes their judgment to be somewhat
clouded. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. at 517 (1968).
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tion of alcohol; that a chronic alcoholic does not appear in public by his own
volition but under a compulsion symptomatic of the disease; and that the defendant was afflicted with the disease of chronic alcoholism. By way of a motion to
quash the complaint, appellant contended that, because he was a chronic alcoholic, his conviction for public intoxication was barred by the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the eighth amendment, as made applicable to the states
by the fourteenth amendment. The trial judge rejected this constitutional defense, 8 found appellant guilty, and fined him $50.00. There being no further
right to appeal within the Texas judicial system, 9 an appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court of the United States.' 0 The Supreme Court (5-4) affirmed the
conviction." Held, a showing of chronic alcoholism is not, by itself, sufficient
to establish a constitutional defense under the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the eighth amendment to a conviction for public intoxication. Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).12
The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive bail should not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."'1 3 Prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment had
its origin in the Magna Carta. 14 The phraseology used in our Bill of Rights is
derived from the English Declaration of Rights of 1688.15 The eighth amendment was adopted in 1791 to prohibit the horrors and violence that had taken
place during the reign of the Stuarts in England. 16 All states but Vermont and
Connecticut have similar provisions and Vermont's highest court has ruled that
the prohibition is a part of the common law of the state. 17 The Connecticut
Constitution makes cruel and unusual punishment a crime. s The universality
of this principle is reflected by its inclusion in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1948.19
Wilkerson v. Utah,"0 decided in 1878, represented the Supreme Court's first
8. The trial judge entered the following conclusion of law: "The fact that a person
is a chronic alcoholic afflicted with the disease of chronic alcoholism, is not a defense to being
charged with the offense of getting drunk or being found in a state of intoxication in any
public place under Art. 477 of the Texas Penal Code." Brief for Appellant at 5, Powell

v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
9.

Vernon's Ann. Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 4.03 (1966).

10. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2).
11. Justices Fortas, Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart dissented.

12. Hereinafter referred to as instant case.
13. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
14. See ch. 14 of the Magna Carta, printed as confirmed by King Edward I in 1297,
4 Halsbury, Statutes of England 24 (2d ed. 1948). "A freeman shall not be amerced for a
small fault; but after the manner of the fault, and for a great fault, after the greatness
thereof; saving to him his contenement; and a merchant likewise, saving to him his merchandise; and any other's villain than ours shall likewise be amerced, saving his wainage."
15. 1 IV. & M., c. 2 § 1.10 "Excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
16. 2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 610 (2d ed. 1851).
17. State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 A. 98 (1934). Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 271 (1950).
18. Conn. Gen. Stat., § 53-20 (1958).
19. "No one shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment." Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 5 1948).
20. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
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significant consideration of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Holding
that death by shooting was not cruel and unusual punishment, 21 the Court recognized that inflexible boundaries could not be thrown up around the eighth amendment. Speaking for the majority, Justice Clifford said: "Difficulty would attend
the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which
provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted .... 1,22 In a
subsequent case, In re Kemmler,23 the Supreme Court characterized punishments
as cruel "when they involve torture or a lingering death." 24 Twenty years later
in Weems v. United States,2 5 the Supreme Court, in establishing the principle
that punishment out of proportion to the offense committed constituted cruel
and unusual punishment, pointed out that the language in Kemmiler did not
formulate an all-inclusive definition of cruel and unusual punishment but served
"only to explain the application of the provision to the punishment of death."2 0
Again refusing to restrain the scope of the amendment, the Court said:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true,
from an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore
taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of a wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth... In the application
of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation can not be only of what
has been but of what may be .... 27
These early Supreme Court cases gave birth to the principle, now firmly
established, that a punishment will be constitutionally condemned if it is barbarous, inhuman, or excessive. These cases also indicate the Court's unwillingness to formulate a precise, all-inclusive definition of cruel and unusual punishment.
Consistent with the views of the Supreme Court, various lower courts have
construed the cruel and unusual punishment clause as prohibiting any punishment which "shocks the sensibilities of men,"'2 8 "shocks public sentiment and violates the judgment of reasonable people," 20 "shocks a balanced sense of jus21. Death by shooting involves no terror. This is in direct contrast to such commonlaw punishments as dragging to the place of execution for treason, emboweling alive, beheading, public dissection for murder and burning alive for treason by a female. Id. at 135.
22.

Id. at 135-36.

23. 136 U.S. 436 (1890). The case involved a sentence to death by electrocution. It was
contended that electrocution violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court
rejected this contention.

24. Id. at 447.
25. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Defendant was convicted in a Philippine Court, at that time
under the authority of the United States, of falsifying a public record. He was sentenced
to 15 years at hard labor in chains, a fine of 4000 pesatas, loss of civil rights during imprisonment and political rights thereafter, and subjected to surveillance by the authorities for life.
26. Id. at 370-71.
27. Id. at 373.
28. Hayes v. United States, 112 F.2d 417, 420 (10th Cir. 1940).
29. Jackson v. United States, 102 F. 473, 488 (9th Cir. 1900).
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tice,"30 "is so greatly disproportionate to the offense committed as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice,"3 1 "shock[s] the moral
sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances."' 32 Operating under these guidelines, appellate courts have rarely sustained appeals grounded on a contention that the punishment meted out by a
35
lower court was cruel and unusual.3 3 Severe fines, 34 aggregate sentences, and
habitual criminal statutes36 have also withstood judicial scrutiny.
In 1958 the Supreme Court again considered the eighth amendment in Trop
v. Dulles)3 7 a case arising under the Nationality Act of 1940. The Court declared

the statute unconstitutional, four Justices 38 holding that the loss of citizenship
as a punishment for crime was cruel and unusual. The case is significant because
the Court recognized that punishment was composed of not only a physical element but a mental element as well, and that the mental element must also be
considered when passing on the question of whether a particular punishment is
cruel and unusual. 39 Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Warren reemphasized the concept embodied in the eighth amendment:
30. Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 1960).
31. Rogers v. United States, 304 F.2d 520, 521 (5th Cir. 1962).
32. State v. Brownridge, 353 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1962).
33. E.g., Bell v. Patterson, 279 F. Supp. 760 (D. Colo. 1968), Jackson v. Dickson, 325
F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1963) (death penalty itself); State v. Alvarez, 182 Neb. 358, 154
N.W.2d 746 (1967), Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7, 136 S.E.2d 766 (1964) (death by electrocution); Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1019
(1966) ; Ralph v. Pepersack, 335 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 925 (1965) ;
Jones v. State, 247 Md. 530, 233 A.2d 791 (1967) (death penalty for rape) ; Young v. Bates,
270 F. Supp. 847 (N.D.W.Va. 1967) (life sentence for armed robbery); Miller v. State,
1 Md. App. 653, 232 A.2d 548 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967) (five year sentence for assault) ;
Washinton v. State, 2 Md. App. 633, 236 A.2d 32 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967) (indeterminate sentence not exceeding 10 years for assault and battery) ; State v. Brownridge, 353
S.W.2 d 715 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1962) (ninety-nine year sentence for forcible rape); Green
v. Teets, 249 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957) (commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment without chance for parole); Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967)
(corporal punishment); Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967) (requirement
that a student cut his hair in order to attend school).
34. E.g., Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909) ($1,623,500 in penalties
for violation of state anti-trust laws assessed against a corporation with over forty million
dollars in assets).
35. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916) (conviction on seven counts of
using the mails to defraud, concurrent five year sentences and $1,000 fines on each count) ;
Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846 (1960)
(conviction on 14 separate counts resulting from the sale of marihuana, two sales of heroin,
and possession of both, sentence of 52 years in jail).
36. E.g., MacDonald v. Fischer, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Beland v. United States, 128
F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 676 (1942); State v. Custer, 240 Or. 350,
401 P.2d'402 (1965) ; Aeby v. State, 199 Kan. 123, 427 P.2d 453 (1967).
37. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Trop was convicted by a court martial of
wartime desertion. The Nationality Act of 1940 provided that anyone so convicted would
lose his citizenship. Trop brought an action for a declaratory judgment that he was an
American Citizen, the case eventually reaching the United States Supreme Court.
38. Chief justice Warren, justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker. justice Brennan
was of the opinion that there was no relevant connection between the act in question and
any power granted to Congress by the Constitution.
39. Speaking of a loss of citizenship, Chief justice Warren said: "It subjects the
individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress. He knows not what discriminations
may be established against him, what proscriptions may be directed against him, and when
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The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the
Amendment stands to assure40 that the power be exercised within the
limits of civilized standards.
The Chief Justice went on the reaffirm the non-static scope of the amendment
in the following language: "The Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. 4 1
Of the decided cases, Robinson v. California42 represents the most novel
application of the eighth amendment. This case marked the first time the Supreme Court expressly incorporated the eighth amendment into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 43 In doing so, the Court struck down a
California statute making it a criminal offense to be addicted to the use of
narcotics. 44 The majority held that to criminally punish a person for being addicted to the use of narcotics, even though the accused had never touched any
narcotic drug in the state45 or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment condemned by the eighth amendment as
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. 40 Starting from the
proposition that narcotics addiction is an illness, 47 the Court reasoned that the
California statute, making the status of narcotics addiction a criminal offense,
and for what causes his existence in his native land may be terminated. He may be subject
to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people. He is stateless, a condition
deplored in the international community of democracies. It is no answer to suggest that all
the disastrous consequences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person.
The threat makes the punishment obnoxious." 356 U.S. at 102.
40. Id. at 100.
41. Id. at 101.
42. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
43. Prior to Robinson, the Court had rejected the proposition that the eighth amendment was applicable to the states. Collins v. Johnson, 237 U.S. 502, 510 (1914); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 92 (1908); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1899). However, in
Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), the Court, by way of dictum,
assumed without deciding that the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment was embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
44. The statute in question was section 11721 of the California Health and Safety
Code which provided: "No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted
to the use of narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a person
licensed by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be the burden of the
defense to show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted of violating any
provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to serve a term
of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the county jail. . . . [In no event does
the court have the power to absolve a person who violates this section from the obligation
of spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county jail."
45. In instructing the jury, the trial judge construed section 11721 as making the
status of narcotics addiction a criminal offense for which the offender may be prosecuted at
any time before he reforms, even though he had never used or possessed any narcotics
within the state and had not been guilty of any antisocial behavior there. 370 U.S. at 662-63.
On appeal, the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the highest court of the state in which a
decision could be had on Robinson's appeal, affirmed, holding the statute constitutional.
Id. at 664. [emphasis added]
46. 370 U.S. at 667.
47. In Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925), the Court had recognized that
persons addicted to narcotics were sick and proper subjects for medical treatment. Counsel
for the State of California conceded that narcotics addiction was an illness. 370 U.S. at
667 n.8.
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punished a person for having an illness. The majority viewed the California statute as similar to a statute making it a criminal offense "for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease."48 "In the light of
contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such
a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel
and unusual punishment. . .. "49 The full impact of Robinson emerges from the
separate concurring and dissenting opinions. 50 Although the dissenting Justices
disagreed with the result reached by the other Justices, their disagreement
centered upon the proper interpretation of the California statute, not on the
principle applied by the majority-that the cruel and unusual punishment clause
of the eighth amendment prohibits the punishment of a person for having an
illness. 1
The Robinson case precipitated challenges to the constitutionality of public
52
intoxication statutes as applied to chronic alcoholics. In Driver v. Hinnant,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the conviction of a chronic alcoholic for public intoxication constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Taking judicial notice of the
48. 370 U.S. at 666.
49. Id.
50. In this context, Justice Douglas' concurring opinion and the dissenting opinions of
Justices Clark and White are of particular importance. Justice Harlan concurred on the
narrow ground that the trial court's instructions permitted the jury to find appellant guilty
on the mere proof that appellant was present in California while he was addicted to
narcotics. Since he viewed narcotics addiction as a mere propensity to use narcotics, Justice
Harlan concludes that the effect of the trial court's instructions was to authorize criminal
punishment for the bare desire to commit a criminal act; a power the state cannot exercise
under its criminal law. 370 U.S. at 678-79.
51. Mr. Justice Douglas in concurring concluded: "This prosecution has no relationship
to the curing of an illness. Indeed, it cannot, for the prosecution is aimed at penalizing an
illness, rather than at providing medical care for it. We would forget the teachings of the
Eighth Amendment if we allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted sick people to
be punished for being sick. This age of enlightenment can not tolerate such barbarous action."
Id. at 677-78.
Mr. Justice Clark interpreted the California statute as applying only to a "volitional
addict" who had not yet lost self-control over the use of narcotics. His disagreement with the
majority rested upon his rather narrow reading of the statute. He did not dispute its
conclusion that punishment of involuntary addiction is unconstitutional. Id. at 679-85.
Justice White concluded that the California statute applied only to an "incipient" or
"voluntary" addict but admitted that, if it were construed to punish the involuntary addict,
...I would have other thoughts about this case." Id. at 685-89.
52. 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). This case arose under a North Carolina Statute,
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-335 (Supp. 1965), which provides: "If any person shall be found drunk
or intoxicated on the public highway, or at any public place or meeting, in any county ...
herein named, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ... ." Driver, convicted and imprisoned
for violating this statute, appealed the conviction to the North Carolina Supreme Court
contending that he was being punished for his sickness, alcoholism, in violation of the eighth
amendment. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. State v. Driver,
262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964). Subsequently, Driver petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal district court on the ground that the imprisonment of an alcoholic for
public intoxication constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment. Despite this constitutional defense and findings of fact that Driver was a chronic
alcoholic and that chronic alcoholism was a disease, the district court held the conviction
valid on the ground that the statute did not punish an alcoholic for his sickness but for the
antisocial act of being drunk in public. Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
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many authoritative definitions of chronic alcoholism as a disease,S Judge Bryan,
speaking for a unanimous court, said:
The addiction-chronic alcoholism-is now almost universally accepted
medically as a disease. The symptoms, as already noted, may appear
as 'disorder of behavior.' Obviously, this includes appearances in public
as here, unwilled and ungovernable by the victim. When that is the
conduct for which he is criminally accused, there can be no judgment
of criminal conviction passed upon him. To do so would affront the
Eighth Amendment, as cruel and unusual punishment in branding him
a criminal, irrespective of consequent detention or fine.54
Convinced that Robinson was the controlling authority under these circumstances, the court said:
Robinson v. State of California ...sustains if not commands, the view
we take. While occupied only with a state statute declaring drug addiction a misdemeanor, the Court in the concurrences and dissents, as well
as the majority opinion, enunciated a doctrine encompassing the present case. The California Statute criminally punished a 'status'-drug
addiction-involuntarily assumed; the North Carolina Act criminally
punishes an involuntary symptom of a status-public intoxication. In
declaring the former violative of the Eighth Amendment, we think
pari ratione, the Robinson decision condemns the North Carolina law
when applied to one in the circumstances of appellant Driver.55
To reach its result, the Fourth Circuit was forced to extend the Robinson rationale. To effectuate this extension, the court used a vehicle which can be most
accurately identified as the "symptomatic approach." 50 By utilizing this approach,
the Driver court was able to apply the Robinson rationale to the chronic alcoholic without taxing the logic of that decision. It is significant to note that the
Driver court considered the branding of Driver as a criminal, not his subsequent incarceration, to be the cruel and unusual punishment involved in the
case. 57 To thus focus upon the "stigma of criminal conviction" was clearly a
recognition of the mental element involved in punishment and was, therefore,
consistent with the views of the Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles."8
Two months after the Driver decision, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, sitting en banc, held in Easter v. District of Columbia0 that the
53. 356 F.2d at 764.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 764-65.

56. In essence, the symptomatic approach entails a recognition of the fact that, after
being driven to the point of intoxication by his disease, the chronic alcoholic loses his selfcontrol. After reaching this stage, his movements and actions, including appearances in public,
are involuntary manifestations of his alcoholism. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
57. 356 F.2d at 765.
58. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
59. 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The Easter case arose under circumstances similar
to the Driver case. Arrested in September 1964, Easter was charged with violating a District
of Columbia statute, D.C. Code Ann. § 25 (a) (1961), which provides: "No person shall
. ..drink any alcoholic beverage . . . [or] be drunk or intoxicated in any street, alley,

part .

.

.

"

At trial, uncontradicted evidence was presented that Easter was a chronic

alcoholic and that chronic alcoholism was the cause of his public intoxication. The trial
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public intoxication of a chronic alcoholic lacks the essential element of criminality and to convict such a person of that crime would also offend the eighth
amendment. To reach this conclusion, the court relied primarily on a 1947 congressional act which defined "chronic alcoholic" as a person who, inter alia,
"has lost the power of self-control with respect to the use of alcoholic beverages." 60 Four judges submitted, as an independent ground 6' for the decision,
that the conviction of a chronic alcoholic for public intoxication constituted the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. 62 Although these judges relied heavily on Driver, they did not make use
of the "symptomatic approach" utilized in that case. Instead they blended the
Driver opinion with the conclusion they had previously reached concerning a
chronic alcoholic's lack of criminal responsibility under the 1947 Act.63 Therefore, they were able to conclude that "[S]ince, as we have seen, public intoxication of a chronic alcoholic is not a crime, to convict one of it as though it were
would also be cruel and unusual punishment .... ,64
In the context of public intoxication convictions, state courts in Georgia, 65
Pennsylvania 6 and Maryland 67 have followed the lead of Driver and Easter
in holding habitual intoxication to be an illness and as such not constitutionally
punishable as a criminal offense. Outside the area of public intoxication convictions, other courts, both state and federal, have responded affirmatively to
the problem presented by the chronic alcoholic. In Sweeney v. United States,65
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was faced with the
question whether it was reasonable to require a chronic alcoholic to refrain from
judge ruled that this evidence was not pertinent to the criminal charge involved. He also
rejected Easter's contention that as a chronic alcoholic, he lacked the criminal capacity
necessary to violate the statute, and that to convict him for publicly exhibiting the symptoms
of his sickness would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment. Easter was found guilty as charged and sentenced to 90 days imprisonment.
However, execution of his sentence was suspended. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction. Easter v. District of Columbia, 209 A.2d 625 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1965).
60. Act of Congress of August 4, 1947, entitled "Rehabilitation of Alcoholics," 61 Stat.
744, ch. 472, now D.C. Code §§ 24-501-24-514 (1961).
61. 361 F.2d at 52 n.6.
62. 361 F.2d at 54. The remaining four judges did not disagree with this independent
ground. However, they did not feel that the constitutional question need be reached.

63. See Note, Driver to Easter to Powell: Recognition of the Defense of Involuntary
Intoxication, 22 Rut. L. Rev. 103, 120 (1967).
64. 361 F.2d at 54-55.
65. Dunlap v. City of Atlanta, Fulton County Ga., Sup. Ct. No. B-29126 (July 17,
1967), reprinted in 113 Cong. Rec. H11089 (August 23, 1967) (Daily ed.).
66. Lee v. Hendricks, Ph. Ct. Common Pleas (Phil.) No. H.C.-0075 (August 31, 1967)
digested in 1 BNA Crim. L. Reptr. 2364 (September 20, 1967), reprinted in 113 Cong. Rec.
H15368 (November 15, 1967) (Daily ed.).
67. State v. Ricketts, Crim. Cir. Ct., Montgomery County Md., No. 8787 (October 25,
1967), reprinted in 113 Cong. Rec. S15974 (November 7, 1967) (Daly ed.).
68. 353 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1965). Convicted of violating the Dyer Act, Sweeney was
placed on probation. One of the conditions of his probation being that he "refrain from the
use of alcoholic beverages in any form." Six months later, Sweeney was arrested for violating
this condition and was ordered to begin serving his original sentences. He brought an action
under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 contending that, because he was a chronic alcoholic, the condition
was unreasonable and therefore that his probation had been unjustly revoked.

345

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
drinking as a condition of probation. In 1968, the Supreme Court of Idaho, in
State v. Oyler6 9 was faced with the same question. Recognizing that alcoholism
is a disease, both courts concluded that it would be unreasonable and perhaps
even vindictive to require a chronic alcoholic to refrain from drinking as a condition of probation. 70 In State v. Freiberg,71 a criminal nonsupport case, chronic
alcoholism was recognized as a disabling disease which, if established, would be
a valid defense to such a charge. Similarly, in Lewis v. Celebrezze, 2 a civil action
to obtain benefits under the Social Security Act, the court recognized chronic
alcoholism as a disabling disease which, if proven, could give rise to benefits
under the Act.
Despite the judicial inroads in this area, the concepts espoused in Driver
and Easter have not received uniform acceptance throughout the country.
People v. Spinks, 73 recently decided by the California Court of Appeals, held
that a public intoxication statute, 74 under which criminal penalties were imposed
on a chronic alcoholic, was not unconstitutional as violative of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment. Construing the statute as
penalizing the act of being in a public place under the influence of intoxicating
liquor and not as punishing a chronic alcoholic for his alcoholism, 75 the court
interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson as limited in scope to stat69. 436 P.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1968). Defendant's probation was revoked for failure
to comply with a condition requiring him to refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages
for one year.
70. In the Sweeney case the Seventh Circuit said: "It appears from the record that
when probation was granted, the district court knew petitioner's history of chronic alcoholism, and had indications of its pathological nature. We think consequently the probation
condition under the facts of the case, would be unreasonable as impossible if psychiatric or
other expert testimony was to establish that petitioner's alcoholism has destroyed his power
of volition and prevented his compliance with the condition." 353 F.2d at 11. In the Oyler
case, the Supreme Court of Idaho remanded the case for a hearing on the question of
whether defendant's alleged alcoholism made impossible his performance of the abstention
condition. The court said: "That a person may be powerless to abstain from more or less
continuous drinking to excess of alcoholic beverages has been formally recognized by medical
and legal authorities. (citing Easter and Driver) Knowingly to impose a probationary condition of total abstention upon such a person, and revocation of probation for his predestined
failure to keep that condition, would be patently as vindictive as demanding a lame person
run for his freedom. . . ." 436 P.2d at 712.
71. 35 Wis. 2d 480, 151 N.W.2d 1 (1967). Defendant contended that he was afflicted
with the illness of chronic alcoholism which prevented him from keeping any employment
which would enable him to support his family. The Court agreed that if this were established
it would be a valid defense. "If sufficient facts were established to show that the defendant
was an alcoholic and that such alcoholism prevented the defendant from working, we would
conclude that the defendant lacked the physical capacity to work." 35 Wis. 2d at 484, 151
N.W.2d at 3.
72. 359 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1966). Accord, Schompert v. Celebrezze, W.D.N.Y. Civil
No. 10,937 (May 24, 1966), reprinted in 112 Cong. Rec. 22718 (September 22, 1966) (Daily
ed.). Both cases involved actions to obtain disability benefits under the Social Security
Act. In the Lewis case, the court said that "where chronic alcoholism alone or in combination
with other causes, is shown to have resulted in a medically determinable disability, rendering
gainful employment impossible, recovery of benefits under the Act ought not to be barred
on account of the origin of the disability." 359 F.2d at 400.
73. 61 Cal. Rptr. 743 (Ct. of App. 1967).
74. West's Calif. Pen. Code Ann. § 647 (F).
75. 61 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
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utes penalizing the status of illness and not applicable to statutes proscribing
acts by the subject of such an illness. 76 Specifically rejecting 'Driverand Easter,
the court characterized these decisions as "based upon a concept of the rule in
Robinson rejected by the courts of this state; [and] premised upon conclusions
we believe to be unsound; and are not acceptable as precedential authority in
the premises."77 The Court of Appeals of Michigan in People v. Hoyt8 expressed similar sentiments concerning the precedential value of Driver and
Easter.79 The Supreme Court of Washington has recently held that an ordinance
prohibiting public drunkenness was valid as applied to a chronic alcoholic-"
This court justified its result by concluding that the ordinance in question bore
a rational relationship to accepted public objectives.
There is also disagreement concerning the reasonableness of total abstinence
conditions imposed on chronic alcoholics during a probationery period. Reaching
a result directly opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court of Idaho, the
Supreme Court of Oregon in Sobota v. Williards held that the revocation of an
alcoholic's probation for drinking intoxicants, in violation of the terms of his
probation, was not improper on the ground that the imposition of such a condition was unreasonable at the outset. The court felt that this result was correct,
notwithstanding the fact that the probationer was an alcoholic whose condition
may be a product of illness or a character disorder. The court justified its result
as necessary for the protection of society and the maintenance of the efficacy of
the probation system, both of which the court felt would be in jeopardy if probation did not include at least an attempt to cause the probationer to discontinue
the kind of conduct which caused his condition.8 2 In 1966 the United States
Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to pass on the constitutionality of punishing a chronic alcoholic for public intoxication.8 3 The Court denied
84
certiorari,Justices Fortas and Douglas dissenting from the denial.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 746.
143 N.V.2d 577 (Ct. of App. 1967).
"[Wjhile we are aware that some courts have recently held it is cruel and unusual

punishment to sentence to prison a chronic alcoholic on a charge of drunk and disorderliness, such decisions are not controlling precedent for this Court and we decline to adopt
them as the law of Michigan for two reasons. First, the record does not persuade us that
defendant is a chronic alcoholic. Second, while we may agree that prison is not the most
appropriate place for chronic alcoholics, we are not prepared to say it is cruel and unusual
punishment to place them there for their own protection as well as that of the general
public." 143 N.W.2d at 578. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals. People v. Hoy, 380 Mich. 597, 158 N.W.2d 436 (1968).
80. City of Seattle v. Hill, 435 P.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
81. 427 P.2d 758 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
82. Id. at 746.
83. Budd v. California, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 909 (1966).
84. Mr. Justice Fortas wrote in his dissent: "Our morality does not permit us to
punish for illness. We do not impose punishment for involuntary conduct, whether the lack
of volition results from 'insanity,' addiction to narcotics, or from other illness. The use of
the crude and formidable weapon of criminal punishment of the alcoholic is neither seemly
nor sensible, neither purposeful nor civilized. This court should determine whether it is
constitutionally permissible, or whether, as the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and
four of the eight judges of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have
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The initial significance of the instant case is that, although five Justices
voted to affirm the conviction, there was no majority opinion rendered. Mr. Justice Marshall announced the decision of the Court in an opinion in which the
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. Justice Harlan joined. Mr. Justice
Black, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, wrote a separate opinion to amplify his
reasons for concurring in the affirmance of the conviction. Mr. Justice White
wrote a separate opinion concurring in the result only. Mr. Justice Fortas wrote
a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and
Mr. Justice Stewart joined.
Despite the fact that there was no majority opinion, the five Justices
who voted for affirmance were in complete accord in an unwillingness to announce
a sweeping new rule of constitutional law grounded upon what was considered an
inadequate record.8 5 Although considering the record deficient in several aspects, 86 the heaviest criticism fell on the trial court's findings of fact. Justice
Marshall, in his opinion, leveled the following criticism at the trial court's findings:
Whatever else may be said of them, those are not 'findings of fact'
in any recognizable, traditional sense in which that term has been used
in a court of law: they are the premises of a syllogism transparently
designed to bring this case within the scope of this Court's opinion in
Robinson v. California .... 87

The separate concurring opinions also expressed dissatisfaction with the findings.88 In contrast, the dissenting Justices, feeling that they were bound to do
so, accepted the trial court's findings of fact.8 9
Mr. Justice Marshall, in his opinion, expressed several grounds for his conclusion that appellant's conviction did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Although he recognized alcoholism as one of the principal social and
public health problems of modem society, Justice Marshall rejected the disease
concept of alcoholism. Concerned over the lack of objectivity in the present
formulation of this concept, Justice Marshall stressed the fact that there "is no
agreement among the members of the medical profession about what it means to
say that 'alcoholism' is a 'disease'. "o He found a similar lack of agreement concerning the symptoms of the "disease of alcoholism." Defending the application
of penal sanctions to inebriates, Justice Marshall noted that the existing facilities
for the treatment of indigent alcoholics are woefully lacking throughout the
held, it is cruel and unusual punishment-punishment in the absence of volitional fault,
punishment which our Constitution forbids." 385 U.S. at 912-13.
85. Instant case, 392 U.S. at 521.
86. "We know very little about the circumstances surrounding the drinking bout which
resulted in this conviction, or about Leroy Powell's drinking problem, or indeed about
alcoholism itself." Id. at 521-22.
87. Id. at 521.
88. Id. at 540 (concurring opinion of Black, J.); Id. at 549 n.1 (concurring opinion
of White, J.).
89. Id. at 557 n.1.
90. Id. at 522.
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country and that "there is as yet no known generally effective method for treating the vast number of alcoholics in our society." 9 ' Faced with these facts, he
concluded that the criminal process is the only presently feasible alternative by
which to solve the problem of the public inebriate. Under these circumstances,
Justice Marshall felt that a brief jail term is at least socially justifiable in that
it removes inebriates from the streets and gives them an opportunity to sober
up.92 However, even if it were assumed that alcoholism is a disease, Justice Marshall would not consider the rationale of Robinson applicable to the public
intoxication of a chronic alcoholic. Construing Robinson as applicable only to
statutes which seek to punish a "mere status," 93 Justice Marshall rejected the
theory that Robinson stands for the principle that criminal penalties may not
be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change:
The entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if
the accused has committed some act, or engaged in some behavior,
which society has an interest in preventing, or perhaps in historical
common law terms, has committed some actus reus. It does not deal
with the question of whether certain conduct can not constitutionally
be punished because it is, in some sense involuntary or occasioned
94
by a compulsion.
Justice Marshall felt that a broader interpretation of Robinson would constitute
the announcement of a constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility; a doctrine the Court has never articulated. 95
Justice Black's concurring opinion is, in many respects, similar to Justice
Marshall's opinion. Justice Black views Robinson as applicable only in a situation where no conduct of any kind is involved, i.e., a pure status crime. Justice
Black would not require the states, under the cruel and unusual punishment
clause, to make an inquiry as to what part of a defendant's personality is responsible for his actions and to excuse anyone whose action was, in some complex,
psychological sense, the result of a compulsion.90
Justice White, concurring in result, wrote an opinion in which he expressed
the view that a chronic alcoholic "with an irresistible urge to consume alcohol
should not be punishable for drinking or for being drunk. 9 7 However, a chronic
alcoholic, unless he could prove that it was impossible for him to resist intoxication and to avoid appearing in public in such a condition,9 8 could be punished
for being in public while intoxicated. Using this type of reasoning, Justice White
concluded that the record failed to establish that appellant could not have avoided
being in public on the occasion in question.
91.

Id. at 527.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

528.
532.
533.
535.
544-46.
549.
551.
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The dissenting Justices found enough agreement among the medical authorities to enable them to accept the disease concept of alcoholism. In considering
this concept, Justice Fortas, writing for the dissent, emphasized the fact that,
despite some definitional problems, medical authorities agree that its core meaning "is that alcoholism is caused and maintained by something other than the
moral fault of the alcoholic, something that... cannot be controlled by him."00
Asserting that the chronic alcoholic offender is caught in a "revolving door" of
arrest, incarceration, and release, the dissenting Justices condemned the jailing
of chronic alcoholics as having neither therapeutic nor deterrent value. Instead
they contended that the use of the criminal process places a tremendous and unneeded burden on law enforcement agencies. The dissenting Justices cite Robinson as placing federal constitutional limitations upon the "power of state legislatures to define crimes for which the imposition of punishment is ordered."'( 0
They interpret Robinson as standing for the principle that "criminal penalties
may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to
change." 10 1 The dissenting Justices, in conjunction with this interpretation of
Robinson, read the trial court's findings to mean that appellant's disease (chronic
alcoholism) involuntarily propelled the appellant into a condition (public intoxication) which the appellant, because of the nature of his disease, had no power
to change. Based on this reading, it is easily concluded that appellant's conduct
cannot be punished without violating the cruel and unusual punishment clause
of the eighth amendment.
Despite the fact that the medical profession has taken great strides toward
meeting and solving the problem of the chronic alcoholic, 0 2 the courts have been
reluctant to recognize chronic alcoholism as a disease or as a defense to any
crime. In the instant case, the validity of the appellant's contentions turned on
the Court's recognition of chronic alcoholism as a disease. Although four of the
Justices who voted to affirm appellant's conviction totally rejected the disease
concept of alcoholism, 0 3 Justice White and the four dissenting Justices embraced the concept. 0 4 The acceptance of this concept by five of the members
of the present Court should spur similar judicial recognition in the lower courts.
Therefore, in this respect, the instant case should produce welcome results. Although it must be conceded that there are, at present, numerous gaps in our
knowledge concerning the diagnosis, treatment, and cure of the "disease of
alcoholism," the fact that chronic alcoholism has been recognized as a disease
99. Id. at 561.
100. Id. at 566.
101. Id. at 567.
102. See Joint Information Service of the American Psychiatric Association and the
National Association for Mental Health, The Treatment of Aleoholismn-A Study of Programs
and Problems 13-26 (1967); Public Health Service of the United States Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, Alcohol and Alcoholism 31-40.
103. Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Harlan, and Marshall.
104. Although Justice White voted to affirm the conviction, even a cursory reading
of his opinion indicates that he accepts the disease concept of alcoholism.
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by an overwhelming majority of the medical profession 0 can not and should
not be ignored by the courts. Justice Fortas, in his dissenting opinion in the
instant case, brought this point forcefully home when he said:
We are . . . woefully deficient in our medical, diagnostic, and
therapeutic knowledge of mental disease and the problem of insanity;
but few would urge that, because of this, we should totally reject the
legal significance of what we do know about these phenomena. 0 6
The time for technical arguments concerning the conceptual difficulties attendant
upon acceptance of chronic alcoholism as a disease has passed. It is time for the
legal profession and the medical profession to work hand in hand to solve the
problem presented by the chronic alcoholic.
The instant case saw the Court closely divided as to the proper rationale
underlying the Robinson case. The divergent interpretations given to Robinson
indicates that the Justices were in disagreement as to how much a limitation the
07
cruel and unusual clause places on the power of the states to define crime.
Justice Marshall and the three Justices who concurred in his views felt compelled to give Robinson the narrowest possible interpretation. Under their interpretation, the cruel and unusual punishment clause was applied in Robinson to
prohibit the State of California from punishing an individual who had not acted
or engaged in any antisocial conduct in that state. 08 Justice White, as well as
the four dissenting Justices, advocated a broader interpretation of the Robinson
case. Under their interpretation, the cruel and unusual punishment clause was
applied in Robinson to prohibit the State of California from punishing an individual for being afflicted with the illness of narcotics addiction. 10 9 If this is correct, Robinson can be viewed as standing for the principle that any punishment
imposed upon an individual for having an illness is excessive. 10 Justices Fortas
and White generalized this proposition and concluded that Robinson stands for
the principle that any punishment imposed upon an individual for being in a
condition he is powerless to change is excessive. According to Mr. Justice Fortas,
the chronic alcoholic can not be punished for the act of being drunk in public
because public appearances are a symptom of the underlying condition (chronic
alcoholism) and punishment for the symptom is punishment for the underlying
condition. However, if it is cruel and unusual to punish an individual for being
in a condition he is powerless to change, is it not equally cruel and unusual to
105. See medical authorities cited supra note 6.
106. Instant case, 392 U.S. at 559-60.
107. At the very least, Robinson prohibits a state from defining a crime which does not
require for its establishment proof that the defendant acted or engaged in some course of
conduct within the state's jurisdiction.
108. This is the "pure status" interpretation advanced by Justices Marshall and Black.
109. See text accompanying supra notes 47-51.
110. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 667 ("Even one day in prison would be
cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold"). Id. at 676
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("The principle that would deny power to exact capital punishment for a petty crime would also deny power to punish a person by fine or imprisonment
for being sick.").
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punish an individual for an act which he is powerless to avoid committing?
Because the "condition which one is powerless to change" rationale could be
logically extended to reach such a result, Justice White and the four dissenting
Justices sought to limit the type of conduct which deserved constitutional immunity. The four dissenting Justices would only afford the protection of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause to conduct which is "part of the syndrome
of the disease of chronic alcoholism,""' i.e., conduct which typically flows from
the disease of chronic alcoholism. Justice White advocated a somewhat narrower
limitation which would require a specific showing that it was impossible for the
individual involved to resist intoxication and to avoid appearances in public
1 2
while in that condition.
Neither the "mere status" rationale advocated by Justice Marshall nor the
"condition which one is powerless to change" rationale offered by Justices Fortas and White is, by itself, entirely satisfactory. The "mere status" rationale
reduces the effect of Robinson to a minimum and restricts that decision to factual
situations which will only infrequently, if ever, arise.113 The "condition which
one is powerless to change" rationale would have a broad impact outside the area
of public intoxication convictions 11 4 and could lead to a constitutional doctrine
of criminal responsibility. 1 5 It is submitted that if the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is to remain a viable concept in
our modern society, the rationale offered by Justices Fortas and White should
be adopted. However, due to the impact this rationale could have on the entire
area of criminal responsibility, reasonable limitations must be imposed. Under
the limitation proposed by Justice Fortas, constitutional immunity is given to
conduct which typically flows from the disease of chronic alcoholism. Therefore,
a public appearance by a chronic alcoholic while intoxicated, being the type of
conduct which typically flows from the disease of chronic alcoholism, cannot be
constitutionally punished. The problem with this proposition is that it is contrary to common knowledge. The great majority of the chronic alcoholics in our
society are of the "invisible" type-they possess the means to keep their drinking problem a secret. 1" 6 The "invisible" chronic alcoholic, although driven by an
irresistible "compulsion" to drink to intoxication, may never appear in public
while intoxicated much less be arrested for public intoxication. For this type of
111. Instant case, 392 U.S. at 559 n.2.
112. Id. at 551.
113. A state would have to make it a criminal offense to have criminal thoughts or
criminal propensities and then attempt to punish an individual for such thoughts or
propensities. See supra note 50.
114. In the context of the narcotics offender consider the following: If a narcotics
addict is charged with illegal use and possession of drugs, is not his use and possession
compelled, is it not a manifestation of a symptom of the disease of narcotics addiction?
The problems become harder when the addict is charged with larceny of narcotics or other
crimes perpetrated in attempt to acquire the drugs he craves." Comment, Alcoholism as a
Defense to a Charge of Public Drunkenness-Implications, 4 Houston L. Rev. 276, 285
(1966).
115. Instant case, 392 U.S. at 534-37.
116. M. Block, Alcoholism-Its Facets and Phases 74-81 (1965).
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individual, a public appearance can hardly be called a symptom of his disease
or conduct which typically flows from it. In contrast, the limitations proposed
by Justice White, i.e., the chronic alcoholic must prove his disease and must also
show that it was impossible for him to avoid public appearances while intoxicated, seem the most appropriate. This is true because the formulations advanced by Justice White can be justified in terms of eighth amendment standards and are also easily applied to the class of chronic alcoholics which account
for the great majority of public intoxication arrests in this country: the skid
row alcoholics." 7 These poor unfortunates are driven to intoxication by their
disease and since they have no homes to go to they remain on the streets. Sooner
or later they become inextricably involved in what has been termed the "revolving door process"; they drink until they become intoxicated, they are arrested
and convicted for public intoxication, they serve some time in the local jail and
then they are returned to the streets to begin drinking again. In effect, this process amounts to a "life sentence on the installment plan""18 for the skid row
alcoholic.
Regardless of how persuasive these considerations may be, the important
inquiry is whether there is a constitutional basis for saying that the skid row
alcoholic may not be punished for being drunk in public. It is submitted that
there is such a basis. The crime of public intoxication is comprised of two
elements-being intoxicated and being found in a public place while in that
condition. Since the skid row alcoholic is always in public, drunk or sober, public
intoxication statutes, as applied to them have the effect of punishing only one of
the elements of the crime-being intoxicated. To allow punishment under these
circumstances is to allow punishment for having an illness, a procedure prohibited by Robinson. Viewed under the more generalized rationale of Robinson,
the skid row alcoholic is a person who is utterly powerless to choose not to
violate the law. The skid row alcoholic is truly a person who is in a condition he
is powerless to change.
Even in terms of traditional eighth amendment tests it would seem that
the skid row alcoholic cannot be punished for public intoxication. The eighth
amendment has traditionally prohibited punishments which are either inhuman
or excessive. Whether a punishment is inhuman or excessive is determined by
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."" 9 In the light of modern medical knowledge concerning chronic
alcoholism and society's sympathy toward the destructive effects of poverty, it
surely must be said that it is inherently inhuman to criminally punish a skid row
alcoholic, who, because he has no home but the streets, is utterly powerless to
avoid breaking the law.
117. See Comment, Alcoholism as a Defense to a Charge of Public Drunkenness-mplications, supra note 114 at 287; Note, Alcoholism, Public Intoxication and the Law, 2
Colum. J. Law & Soc. Prob. 109, 110 (1966).

118. Benz, A Profile of the Alcoholic in the Monroe County Penitentiary, in N.Y.

Conference on Priorities in Developing Services for the Alcoholic Offender 12 (1964).
119. See text accompanying supra note 41.
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Although Justice White suggested other situations in which he would afford
eighth amendment protection to the chronic alcoholic, 120 the situation presented
by the skid row alcoholic is of immediate concern to the courts and society. 121
It can be argued that the "condition which one is powerless to change"
rationale will eventually lead to a constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility. However, if such a result is necessary to preserve the viability of the
eighth amendment, can we say it is a bad result?
Society has traditionally sought to deal with the public manifestations of
chronic alcoholism under the auspices of the criminal law. This method has
been unsuccessful in dealing with the problem. Penal sanctions do not deter
the public intoxication of a skid row alcoholic. 122 Criminal penalties are equally
ineffective to rehabilitate these individuals. 12 3 Once chronic alcoholism is accepted as a disease, the theory of retribution-imprisonment of the offender for
his wrong against society-is unacceptable. To do so would offend societal
concepts of fairness.
When, and if, the chronic alcoholic is able to make the proper showings so
as to be able to invoke the eighth amendment as a defense to a conviction for
public intoxication, what is to be done with these unfortunate individuals? It
is always possible to direct the police to ignore the public inebriate on the
ground that it would not be worth the time to try to get a conviction which the
constitution might, in particular cases, prevent. 124 However, this is not a
responsible solution because it does nothing to alleviate the social ill. A more
positive alternative would be to require the police to take all those picked up for
public intoxication to a hospital for a physical evaluation. If these individuals
are in need of medical care, they could then be hospitalized instead of jailed.
If medical care is deemed unnecessary, the inebriate could be held until he
had sobered up and then be released to the community. 125 Although this method
will not completely "cure" the chronic alcoholic, it at least places the locus of
120.

Instant case, 392 U.S. at 551-52.

121. The sheer number of arrests for public intoxication and the cost of processing
those arrested puts a tremendous strain on law enforcement agencies and the courts. Instant
case at 563-65 and authorities there cited. Society is hostile to the skid row alcoholic:
"The public detests the view not only of the sleeping drunk but also of the unproductive
member of society." Comment, Alcoholism as a Defense to a Charge of Public Drunkenness-Implications, supra note 114 at 288.
122. For example, appellant in the instant case had been arrested seventy-three times
for public intoxication. The records in the Driver and Easter cases reflect similar arrest
statistics. Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae, Appendicies C and D, Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514 (1968). "One alcoholic in Houston boasted that after release from a thirty-day term on
the farm he was returned without having missed a meal." Comment, Alcoholism as a Defense
to a Charge of Public Drunkenness-Implications, supra note 114 at 287-88.
123. "Incarceration never cured a derelict, never did and never will . . . . The penal
approach to this problem is at best a feeble attempt to repair damage done in early childhood." Murtagh, The Derelicts of Skid Row, Atlantic Monthly, March 1962, at So.
124. "New York City no longer enforces its public drunkenness statutes, arresting only
drunks who are disorderly in public (fewer than 15,000 per year)." Comment, Alcoholism
as a Defense to a Charge of Public Drunkenness-Implications,supra note 114 at 290.
125. The St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department has recently adopted such a
system. Id. at 280 n.31.
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responsibility for the alcoholic in the treatment sphere. The most obvious alternative to the criminal process is legislation requiring that all chronic alcoholics arrested for public intoxication be subjected to mandatory civil commitment for treatment. Civil commitment of chronic alcoholics for treatment of
their disease, as opposed to incarceration, can reap substantial dividends. 126
Although some may argue that the cost of this alternative is prohibitive, the
large sums previously used to incarcerate the chronic alcoholic could be diverted
to provide adequate treatment facilities.1 27 Whatever the source of the funds,
an enlightened legislative response is necessary. Although this is by no means
an exhaustive examination of the possible alternatives to the criminal process,
it does indicate that there are reasonable alternatives which would be more
responsive to the problem.
Assuming that mandatory civil commitment is the alternative selected, the
burden will fall on the courts to determine which public inebriate is afflicted
with the disease of chronic alcoholism. Despite the fact that no single test, by
itself, may be satisfactory, there are several possibilities: (1) medical evidence
given after a clinical evaluation period of several days in the hospital, (2)
recidivism, and (3) outward physical and mental manifestations of chronic
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alcoholism.
The impact the Powell case will have on the punishment of chronic alcoholics
for public intoxication is not completely dear. Because of the manner in which
the Justices disagreed, variation in application will be the trademark of this
decision. However, the Powell case does not close the door on the chronic alcoholic's plea for relief. If the right record presents itself, the Court may be
moved to reconsider the wisdom of the result reached in Powell.
ROBERT E. KELLER
126. See Houston Council on Alcoholism, Report on the Houston Inter-Agency
Alcoholism Program 3 at 7-8, 13-14 (1961-1963).
127. "In Chicago alone it is estimated that the annual expenditure of public funds on
behalf of Skid Row men amounts to $4,719,948." Plunkert, Skid Row Can Be Eliminated,
Fed. Prob., June 1961, at 42.

128. See Comment, Alcoholism as a Defense to a Charge of Public DrunkennessImplications, supra note 114 at 281-84.

